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Maritime Power in Southeast
Asia
by CDRE Teo Chee Hean
It is a great honour to be invited to speak to such a gathering of persons brought together by an interest in maritime
and naval affairs.
The approach that I will take is a simple one, from the point of view of a small country. If I may use an analogy
from economics, we are a "price taker" rather than a "price fixer"; we have practically no
ability to change the geo-strategic environment in which we live and must accept what comes and try to do the best
we can in the given set of circumstances. I will begin therefore with a historical survey of Southeast Asia.
I will attempt to demonstrate that the history of Southeast Asia is really the maritime history of Southeast Asia.
I have picked my examples deliberately and in the most unacademic way to support this assertion. This survey will
help us to appreciate how we got to where we are, and identify constants and trends that will assist in our analysis
of maritime power in Southeast Asia today and in the future.
Geography and Early History
Southeast Asia can be divided into continental Southeast Asia - the Indo-Chinese countries Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia,
and Burma and Thailand - and maritime Southeast Asia which includes Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei
and Singapore.
Continental Southeast Asia lies between two great Asian powers that have influenced this region - India and China.
In continental Southeast Asia, the two powers have vied for power over the centuries as they attempted to expand
their own influence and counter that of others. In the colonial period, the various occupying colonial powers superimposed
their interests on the region. But even then, the fault lines imposed by geography could still be seen. British
and French rivalry resulted in Thailand being accepted as a neutral buffer state between British Burma and French
Indochina in the 1800s. Attempts by India and China to gain influence in this area continue into the present day.
China, for example, is quite pleased to assist Burma, and India has remained one of Vietnam's most constant friends.
But I touch on continental Southeast Asia only so that I can shift away quickly to what we are more interested
in - maritime Southeast Asia.
Maritime Southeast Asia consists of more sea than land. There is the Malay peninsula, several large islands and
tens of thousands of small islands. It is not surprising therefore that from early times, power in Southeast Asia
was associated with maritime power. One of the earliest documented maritime empires was the Srivijaya Empire centred
near Palembang in central Sumatra. Srivijaya rose rapidly to power in the latter part of the 7 th century and it
extended over both coasts of the Malacca Straits, West Sumatra and western Borneo. It commanded the major trading
routes within Southeast Asia as well as the Malacca and Sunda straits - the key routes between the Indian Ocean
and the China seas.
But Srivijaya was not without its competitors. It had to face rivals from south Thailand and from as far away as
India. Its influence and power eventually declined and by early 14 th century, Srivijaya had been surpassed in
maritime Southeast Asia by the Majapahit empire based in east Java and the Sukhothai Kingdom. Both exerted claims
on the Malay Peninsula and the area was in considerable turmoil. Also, by the 11 th century, Chinese trading ships
had started to appear in greater numbers in Southeast Asia.
Out of this turmoil grew the great trading port of Malacca which was founded at the beginning of the 15 th century.
Malacca grew to become the major trading port in Southeast Asia. The Chinese under the Ming dynasty had decided
that they would establish direct trading links in the region, and on the first of his seven great voyages to the
Indian Ocean, Admiral Cheng Ho, the famous Chinese admiral, called at Malacca. China extended its protection to
Malacca and this helped to deter other regional challenges to its power.
Islam, another major influence in Southeast Asia today arrived with traders from India in the late 13 th and 14
th centuries and its influence had spread to the extent that by the mid-15 th century, Malacca, the pre-eminent
trading port in Southeast Asia, was a Muslim sultanate.
At the beginning of the 16 th century, rivalries over the control of sea trade were once again to bring dramatic
changes to Southeast Asia. In an effort to break the Arab monopoly on trade between Europe and Asia, the Portuguese
decided to establish direct trading links in Asia. The potential riches from the trade persuaded them to embark
upon a series of expeditions to gain control of the trade by force. In 1511, the Portuguese attacked and captured
Malacca.
But political changes in Europe in the 17 th century and rivalry over who would control the Asian trade, reared
its head again and the Dutch became the fierce rivals of the Portuguese in Southeast Asia, eventually conquering
Malacca in 1641. The English were not to be left out and they too attempted to set up their own trading ports to
rival Malacca. Even as the European powers sought to control the Asian trade, various Southeast Asian trades too
were struggling to gain supremacy in Southeast Asia. Sometimes they competed with and fought the Europeans, but
at other times they sought alliances of convenience with which to strengthen themselves against their rivals. Aceh
in North Sumatra, Johor in South Malaya and Bugis in Sulawesi were some of these rival maritime-based powers.
The English gradually built up their position by establishing themselves in Benkulen in West Sumatra, Borneo and
Penang; and in 1819 they established a trading post in Singapore. Dutch and English rivalries intensified, and
in 1824, in the Treaty of London, the English and Dutch established their spheres of influence using the Malacca
Straits as the demarcating line; they exchanged Benkulen and Malacca. The results of this treaty of 1824 are still
evident today and manifest themselves in today's Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei.
English and Dutch dominance in Southeast Asia was to continue until the mid-20 th century. Elsewhere in maritime
Southeast Asia, the Spaniards had gained control of the Philippines from the late 16 th century, passing control
to the Americans in the late 19 th century after the Spanish-American War.
During WW I, Japan was an ally of the British. But it soon became clear that Japanese and British interests were
diverging and naval strategists in Tokyo and in London began to look at what might need to be done in the event
of war.
Once again Southeast Asia was to be drawn into centrestage. The British constructed a great naval base in Singapore
to support a main fleet that would sail east to defend British interests against Japan. Likewise, the Japanese
calculated that in order to succeed, they would have to destroy the American fleet in Pearl Harbor as well as wrest
control of Singapore from the British. In both of these, the Japanese succeeded. But as Admiral Yamamoto himself
foresaw, the Japanese soon over-extended themselves, and the industrial might of America carried the war to Japan
and defeated them.
Following the end of WW II, the exhausted British, Dutch and French had little choice but to allow their colonies
in Southeast Asia to become independent. The British withdrew their forces from "East of Suez" in 1971
and left the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) with Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and the UK
to provide a consultative framework for security in Malaysia and Singapore.
The US was left as the strongest military power in Southeast Asia, and turned her attention to keeping the dominoes
in Southeast Asia from falling to communism. The war in Vietnam did buy the other fledgling countries in Southeast
Asia a few precious years to get on their own feet. Southeast Asia is now enjoying one of the fastest economic
growth rates in the world.
Let us pause here to see what lessons geography and history have to offer us about the place of maritime power
in Southeast Asia.
Lessons from Geography and History
From our quick survey, I would just like to make three points. Firstly, within Southeast Asia, the exercise of
power and influence depends on being able to make use of the seas within Southeast Asia. This is clearly illustrated
by the long succession of competing powers who have sought to impose their will on maritime Southeast Asia. Each
state that flourished succeeded in controlling the sea and the trade that flowed across it. As its power waned,
control of the sea and of trade passed on. In the modern context, sea power is necessary to protect the territorial
integrity and other maritime interests of the Southeast Asian states. Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia clearly
have a need to do so in order to retain cohesion among the different parts of their countries widely separated
by sea. All the ASEAN states depend on the sea to carry the trade - internal and external - that powers their economies.
Secondly, Southeast Asia lies between the two major Asian powers, India and China. While the land route between
India and China is shorter, there are many natural obstacles. The seas provide a more convenient route. Over many
centuries, these two countries have left their mark on the culture, religion, language, population and politics
of the region. In relatively recent times, China had been the main supporter of communist revolutionary movements
throughout Southeast Asia. In 1979, China attacked Vietnam to "teach it a lesson" for invading Cambodia,
and China has had considerable influence over the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. India and China have recently been preoccupied
with their own internal problems, but the sheer size of these two countries relative to Southeast Asia means that
they must always remain a factor to be considered. As I mentioned earlier, the Chinese take pains to cultivate
Indian Ocean states such as Burma, and the Indians likewise, cultivate South China Sea states such as Vietnam.
And one can think of a variety of scenarios where the seas in Southeast Asia will become vital to both countries
if their rivalry were to be heightened. Even if the two powers were to cooperate, the main thoroughfare would pass
through Southeast Asia.
The third point about geography is that Southeast Asia is of interest to countries well beyond the region. It is
rich in natural resources and its sea routes are vital for maritime traffic. The Europeans first came to Southeast
Asia to secure not only the spices and other trade here, but also the trade routes to China. Today, the commodities
and the countries may be different but the region is still a major source of strategic materials such as rubber,
tin and oil. Japan, Europe and America depend on the routes in Southeast Asia for the movement of fuel, raw materials
and finished products. This is true also for Australia and New Zealand especially since trade with the rapidly
growing economies of Japan, Korea, China and Southeast Asia must all transit Southeast Asian waters.
What we can conclude from geography is that regardless of what Southeast Asian nations themselves may wish, Asian
and other maritime powers do have important interests in Southeast Asia; and they will continue to want to assert
themselves in order to ensure that their interests are not jeopardised. We cannot wish them away even though their
presence here may not always totally conform with the desires of regional states to preserve their territorial
integrity and security within their waters.
Contemporary Factors
While a study of the major historical trends and geography provide some useful insights on maritime power in
Southeast Asia, there are also more recent occurrences which have an impact on this subject. I will deal specifically
with two major ones: the changing world geo-strategic situation and the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS).
The Changing World Geo-Strategic Situation
The last 20 to 30 years have been a period of relative stability and growth for the countries of maritime Southeast
Asia. While war raged in Vietnam and Cambodia, the countries of maritime Southeast Asia were largely insulated
from its bad effects.
When viewed against the global setting, these were only part of the post-WW II struggle between Communism and the
Free World from which Southeast Asia was not exempt.
One consequence of this struggle was that regional conflicts got subsumed into the bigger game. Neither superpower
was prepared to allow too great a change in the power alignments in any region, nor allow a regional conflict to
escalate uncontrollably into a direct confrontation between them. This meant that regional conflicts were allowed
to simmer and sometimes reach boiling point, but no major upheavals would take place.
But now the struggle is over. The world order, frozen in place for 40 years, has started to unravel. In maritime
Southeast Asia, what this means is that a question mark now hangs over the US presence which has provided the security
umbrella under which the Southeast Asian states have prospered.
The US finds it increasingly difficult to secure the resources to maintain its force presence in Southeast Asia
at current levels.
The medium powers also will not feel as constrained as before by the need to remain allied to one or the other
of the superpowers, and can now pursue their own national interests.
While the superpowers have been locked in their struggle, things have not remained unchanged. Japan has emerged
as an economic giant. In an era of superpower nuclear rivalry, she was quite content to remain a military midget
as her history compelled her to eschew nuclear weapons. But now that the nuclear stand-off is over, her considerable
conventional forces and sizeable build-up plan mean that Japan is in a position to adjust her military profile
to one more in keeping with her status as an economic superpower.
How can we in Southeast Asia, especially the small countries, respond to this new situation? Singapore, for example,
became independent only in 1965, and has lived her entire 26 years of independence within the structure of this
Cold War US security umbrella. We have no direct experience of any other regime.
There are few principles that will guide us. Firstly, as any traveller who sets out on a journey into the unknown
will tell you, prepare yourself well. This is the reason that Singapore, since independence, has been steadily
investing in building up her own defence capability. The Singapore Armed Forces today is a source of strength and
provides Singaporeans added confidence to face the future. Other ASEAN neighbours, particularly Indonesia, share
the same view - that the ASEAN countries should build up their national resilience. With national resilience in
each country, there will be no weak links in the region to exploit; and by working together, there will be regional
resilience. The region as a whole will be better prepared to face the unknown.
Secondly, travel with friends - people you know well, with whom you share common interests, and who have shown
themselves to be reliable in the past. This is the reason why the FPDA is so important to us. The FPDA provides
us not only the psychological confidence that we have friends, but also provides opportunities for us to constantly
train with one another so that we can work together if we ever need to. This is the reason also, that Singapore
supports a continued US presence in Southeast Asia. We have offered the use of facilities in Singapore for US fighter
aircraft and naval ships. A continued US presence will provide stability in Southeast Asia in a period of dramatic
global changes.
Thirdly, seek out on your travels new friends. We need to seek out and constructively engage other powers that
are benign and whose interests are coincident. We have to explain ourselves and try to understand them. We would
want, for example, to constructively engage Japan so that her foreign and security policies will evolve in a way
which are mutually beneficial.
Let us shift now to another recent development that has had a significant impact on maritime power in Southeast
Asia.
UNCLOS
UNCLOS has also dramatically changed the map of Southeast Asia. Or it might be more accurate to say that the technology
of modern methods of exploiting the resources of the sea - living and non-living - have dramatically changed the
way that the states look upon the seas. UNCLOS attempts to balance two sets of competing demands. The first set
relates to rights of passage for international shipping versus rights of coastal states to protect their territorial
integrity and security. We have alluded to the tension between these two demands in the earlier discussion on geography.
I believe that the UNCLOS has come to a reasonable compromise when we apply its provisions to Southeast Asia. While
archipelagic states like Indonesia and the Philippines have safeguards for their territorial integrity and security
in the archipelagic waters provisions and in the extension of the territorial sea to 12 miles, maritime states
like Singapore have safeguards for passage through straits used for international navigation and archipelagic sea
lanes.
To illustrate the balancing of competing demands, I will use the Singapore situation as an example. The extension
of the territorial sea limits to 12 miles by Malaysia and Indonesia means that Singapore and her territorial waters
are completely surrounded by Malaysian and Indonesian territorial waters, and that we have no access to the high
seas other than through the territorial waters of our neighbours. For Singapore, the access to sea routes is particularly
critical. Singapore's annual trade value is some three times her GDP, and most of it goes by sea. Compared to similar
figures for Korea (75 percent), Australia (33 percent) and Japan (25 percent), this trade dependency is one of
the highest in the world.
If not for the provisions guaranteeing transit passage through straits used for international navigation, Singapore
would literally be in dire straits.
The second set of competing demands refer to the claims for exclusive economic exploitation for the coastal states.
In maritime Southeast Asia, this means that states which never previously had boundaries with each other suddenly
find that they do, and that these are not at all well defined. Who would have thought that Brunei and Vietnam have
a common border or China and Malaysia. Disputes over EEZs have already started and are likely to accelerate. The
potentially mineral-rich Spratlys and Paracels are the subject of competing claims. Six countries have laid claim
to various parts of Spratlys with China claiming the entire group. The claimants have backed up their claims in
several cases with the deployment of military forces. Despite the efforts of Indonesia during the recent conference
in Bandung, where for the first time, all the claimants were brought together under one roof, no resolution of
the conflicting claims is in sight.
Maritime Power Defined
Thus far, I have been deliberately using the term "maritime power" somewhat loosely without properly
defining it. If one were to take a narrow interpretation, then it would mean the ability of a country to impose
its will on another in the maritime arena. This definition implies that maritime power is associated with contention.
One country's exercise of will over another means that one country is more powerful than the other, and that countries
seek to maximise their power in this narrow sense.
I find this interpretation too narrow. I prefer to think of maritime power as the aggregate of a country's ability
to make use of the sea in order to fulfil its national economic, security and other goals. This interpretation
allows for a rather more cooperative way of looking at maritime power. Instead of imposition of wills, countries
can cooperate to mutually increase their maritime power by making use of the sea in a way which they could not
before.
If we were to interpret maritime power in the broader sense, then there are cooperative efforts of many different
types. For example, combined patrols could be conducted by maritime forces to ensure security. Combined exercises
could be conducted to ensure that forces will be capable of working together should the need arise. Much is already
being done in this area, with the FPDA being a good example.
But besides security-related efforts, other things can be done to increase the use of the sea. The development
and maintenance of a good network of ports will lead to increased trade; and a negotiated agreement on joint exploitation
of mineral deposits in areas of overlapping claims would allow each country to enjoy some of the benefits rather
than none being able to do so. The arrangements reached between Australia and Indonesia for joint exploitation
are a good example.
What Australia Can Do
Let us shift focus just slightly - towards Australia to see where the country fits in and what she can do. Australia
has many important interests in Southeast Asia. We are your nearest neighbours and an important trading partner.
Your trade route to the rest of Asia pass through Southeast Asian waters.
Australia has had a long history of contributions to Southeast Asia. In WW II, the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam
War, Australian forces played important roles. Without your contributions, I am certain that the picture before
us today of Southeast Asia would be quite different. You continue to show a strong commitment to FPDA. We in Singapore,
and I am sure also in Malaysia, very much appreciate this commitment.
As partners in FPDA, it is also encouraging to note that Australia has shown a willingness to contribute forces
to international operations such as those in the Persian Gulf, to contain aggression and promote peace, even in
areas quite distant from Australian shores. This surely is a clear signal that Australia can be counted on as a
partner to oppose aggression and preserve peace in the Southeast Asian region.
It is important for Australia to maintain these strong relations in Southeast Asia. To do so effectively, Australia
needs to make use of the entire range of tools at its disposal, to build up a good network of economic, political,
cultural and military relations. In this way, Australia sends a clear signal that it intends to be very much a
part of and a major player in the Asia-Pacific community of states; and Australia will be well positioned to influence
Southeast Asian nations to embark on projects that are mutually beneficial.
Main Conclusions
From our survey of geography and history, we concluded firstly that maritime power is important within the region
for regional countries themselves in order to maintain their territorial integrity and secure their sea lines of
communications.
Secondly, because of Southeast Asia's location between India and China, these two countries cannot be ignored in
the long-term even if they are pre-occupied with internal problems in the short-term.
Thirdly, because of the importance of Southeast Asian sea routes to the world trading system, and the value of
the natural resources that can be found there, the major powers in the world will always want to be able to influence
events in the region.
From our analysis of the changing world geo-strategic situation, our conclusion is that the US security umbrella
will give way to a more uncertain situation. Southeast Asian countries would do well to develop national and regional
resilience, to build upon old friendships and alliances like FPDA and with the US, and to seek out and develop
an understanding with new players like Japan so that their foreign and security policies will develop in a mutually
beneficial way.
In considering the effects of UNCLOS, we concluded that UNCLOS has made a positive contribution by balancing competing
demands. But the competing claims that result from the extended territorial and EEZ regimes open new areas of potential
conflict. Countries should look at maritime power in its widest sense, avoid contention and confrontation, and
seek cooperation in order to maximise the aggregate ability of a country to benefit from making use of the sea
to fulfil its national economic, security and other goals.
Finally, Australia has much to gain from being a major in Southeast Asia and the larger Asia-Pacific community.
Australia should use the entire range of tools at her disposal to build up a good network of economic, political,
cultural and military relations.
References
1. Osborne, Milton, South- East Asia - An Introductory History, George Allen and Unwin, 1983.
2. Turnbull, C Mary, A Short History of Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, Graham Brash, Singapore, 1981.
RADM (NS) Teo Chee Hean is presently Minister for Education and Second Minister for Defence.
Last updated: 18-Jul-2005
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WORLD AFFAIRS
A strategic move
P.S. SURYANARAYANA
in Singapore
The U.S. decision to help Indonesia "modernise" its military establishment is a strategic move that may
acquire unforeseen importance in 2006.
MARITIME security is being cited by the United States as a "joint objective" that deserves to be pursued
in association with Indonesia, among a few others, in East Asia. In fact, "maritime security" has been
bracketed with "counter-terrorism" and "disaster relief" in a new catalogue of reasons for
strategic cooperation between Washington and Jakarta.
To be sure, the U.S. has not formally identified Indonesia as a strategic ally or partner in East Asia. However,
the U.S. decision on November 22, 2005, to help Indonesia "modernise" its military establishment (TNI
in local parlance) was a strategic move which, in the reckoning of regional diplomats and analysts, may acquire
unforeseen importance in 2006. However, if no definitive diplomatic bets are being placed yet on such a possibility,
the reasons have much to do with Indonesia's slow-paced resurgence as a democracy that could also stay stable over
the longer term.
Another factor of uncertainty has to do with the durability of America's attention span in regard to Indonesia
in this context. Relevant to this aspect is Washington's growing strategic dependence on China to resolve the issues
relating to the nuclear-weapons programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the East Asian
theatre itself.
What is reasonably clear, despite such ifs and buts, is the U.S. move to try and coopt Indonesia for a policy of
creating a second line of China containment. With the U.S. having updated and reinforced its long established military
alliance with Japan in October 2005 (Frontline, August 12, 2005), the main strategic battle-lines were indeed firmed
up for Washington's bid to prevent China from emerging as a peer-competitor in the Asia-Pacific region.
The U.S. is obviously scouting for more friends and allies for a potential global-scale containment of China over
a longer term. India does figure in such a U.S. calculus, but that is a different story.
From the U.S perspective, the control of key sea lanes in the Asia-Pacific zone is essential, for two sets of reasons.
There is the more obvious objective of "counter-terrorism" and anti-piracy operations in the current
global milieu of political priorities. But, there is also the discernible U.S. objective of keeping an eye on China,
itself a growing maritime power.
Now, the strategic importance of Indonesia, the world's largest archipelago-state that straddles important sea
lanes, has not been missed by the U.S., long schooled in the `thoughts' of Alfred Thayer Mahan, a `guru' who advocated
maritime supremacy as a defining aspect of American power. Indonesia, surely, has a long way to go before its potential
as a major maritime power can be realised. However, when the U.S. decided to help it "modernise" the
TNI, the naval angle was kept in prime focus, "maritime security" being projected as a "joint objective".
There is an often downplayed, or even ignored, reason why Indonesia is particularly important for a global maritime
player like the U.S. The Straits of Malacca in South-East Asia is arguably the busiest sea lane for global trade
and it covers, at once, the interests of major economic powerhouses like the U.S., Japan, and China. It and the
adjoining Straits of Singapore have been increasingly identified as potential terrorist targets in view of their
enormous economic importance to the U.S. and its friends and allies.
In this context, the maritime passageways that crisscross the Indonesian archipelago can, if suitably developed,
serve as an alternative to the Straits of Malacca. The economic viability of such a project may not have been worked
out by the governments concerned. However, the political attractiveness of an alternative global trade route across
South-East Asia remains a compelling proposition.
A counter-point, obviously, is whether Indonesia, which is increasingly seen as a fertile territory for Al Qaeda
and its "regional affiliate", the Jemaah Islamiyah (J.I.), can indeed provide a safe alternative route
for global trade.
It is in this subtext that the U.S. reasoning for helping Indonesia "modernise" the TNI makes interesting
reading. The ongoing democratisation of the Indonesian polity and its current emergence as "a voice of moderation
in the Islamic world", under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, have been outlined in justification of the
U.S. move to befriend the TNI and help Jakarta beef up its military muscle.
As for U.S. appreciation of Indonesia's undeniable democratisation at this stage, the political irony is that Washington's
hands are not clean insofar as the political evolution of this South-East Asian country is concerned. It is widely
chronicled that the U.S. had aided the process of toppling a democratically elected government in Indonesia in
the 1950s. This does not, however, cast a slur on Indonesia's current efforts to energise itself as a resurgent
democracy.
Equally important is the U.S.' latest certification of Indonesia's moderation as the world's largest Muslim majority
country. At one level, the recent terrorist strike in the Indonesian holiday resort of Bali, the second such major
attack there in about four years, has served as a grim reminder of the challenges that Jakarta still faces on this
front. At another, President Yudhoyono has reassured the international community of his political resolve to ensure
that the terrorists do not fly under the radar.
Significant, against this backdrop, are the difficulties that Indonesia has encountered in securing the full cooperation
of the U.S. for anti-terror preparedness. Washington's sense of proprietary prerogative in investigating Hambali,
an Indonesian national and a suspected top leader of the J.I., is illustrative of these difficulties. Hambali was
caught in Thailand under a U.S.-led anti-terror operation in 2003.
Given these realities, the U.S. reasoning for moving closer to Indonesia has at least as much to do with its democratic
polity and moderation in the Islamic world as with other and strategic considerations. With the TNI having been
the target of much U.S. criticism over the years and with Indonesia having come under the U.S.' military-related
sanctions in the past, the latest American move has a clear strategic thrust of the lift-off kind.
The strategic scene is not complicated, though. In 2004, the U.S. came up with the idea that a regional maritime
security initiative (RMSI) be implemented to safeguard the shipping lanes of the Straits of Malacca. The proposal
sparked instant resistance from Malaysia and also Indonesia which, along with Singapore, constitute the littoral
domain of the Straits of Malacca. The opposition from Indonesia and Malaysia (Frontline, July 1, 2005) was based
on the reasoning that there was no justification to jettison the principle of national sovereignty over maritime
zones in order to allow the formidable U.S. Navy a free run of the Straits of Malacca. The U.S. counter-argument
was that the narrow waterway, as an international shipping route, had no sovereign maritime zones at all.
The resistance to the RMSI prompted much thinking about suitable alternatives, although the U.S. never really gave
up the idea altogether. As a result, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have, for some time now, resorted to "coordinated
patrolling" of the Straits of Malacca. This is entirely in harmony with the principle of national sovereignty
of the littoral states.
In August 2005, the littoral states initiated the "Eyes in the Sky" project to supplement the coordinated
naval patrolling. Essentially a "maritime air patrol", the project was extended by the littorals to Thailand,
which falls within their geopolitical neighbourhood.
It is in this context of proactive patrolling of the Straits of Malacca by the local players that the U.S. has
now wooed Indonesia, a key littoral state, whose President, formerly a TNI chief, had undergone military training
at American facilities during his non-civilian career.
Yudhoyono has not so far emerged as an Indonesian Musharraf for American strategic purposes. Nor has the Indonesian
leader indicated whether his country would be willing to play second fiddle to the U.S. in any future China-containment
project. However, as a former military leader with Eisenhower-like ambitions, Yudhoyono knows the value of U.S.
help for the TNI's modernisation. More significantly, Washington has made no secret of its intention to recruit
Indonesia as a potential ally in these circumstances, and maritime security is an honourable proposition.
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