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Wawasan Nusantara ( Archipelagic Concept)

On December 13, 1957, the Indonesian Government issued a declaration on the territorial waters of the Republic, stating that al the waters surrounding and between the islands in the territory came within indonesia's sovereignty.

In 1960 the Djuanda Declaration was ratified by Legislative/Assembly with the enactment of Act No.4 regarding Indonesian Waters on February 18, 1960.The bill expanded Indonesia's overall territory by about 2.5-fold, from 2,027,087 sqkm to 5,193,250 sqkm.
On 28 July 1962 the Act on Innocent Passage was enacted
The Act deals with navigational conduct and establishes the operational criteria by which to determine the "innocent" character of maritime passge through its waters. It also contains regulations which must be obliged by foreign ships intending innocent passage.

Pacific Choke Point
By Richard Halloran


The US military now feels a need to keep a wary eye on the Strait of Malacca and its neighborhood.

Halfway around the world from the US mainland, between Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia, runs the 550-mile-long
trait of Malacca, a route traversed by tens of thousands of merchant and warships sailing between the
Pacific and Indian Oceans. At its eastern terminus, the strait opens into the South China Sea.

Linked together, they form a choke point extraordinaire that exists in the shadow of armed pirates, stateless terrorists, and national armed forces. If the world were to lose access for an extended period, the consequences for the industrialized world, including the United States, would be grave.

The Pacific passageway is critical today for two reasons:

* The lane has become vital to the maintenance of world commerce. Through this constricted oceanic area passes some 30 percent of the planet’s trade. Supertankers traversing the waterway bring in 80 percent of the oil needed to fuel the economies of Japan and China. More ships pass through it than through the Panama and Suez Canals combined. Blockage would be catastrophic. Use of alternative routes would at least triple and possibly quintuple sailing times. Insurance costs would soar. Blows from increased costs and disruptions would damage the US economy.


* It is potentially a military hot spot. The US Navy, which has been shifting its weight into the Pacific and Indian Oceans under a new maritime strategy, views this passage as the essential throughway between the two oceans. In April, for instance, the carrier Abraham Lincoln sailed from the US West Coast across the Pacific and passed through the South China Sea to Singapore. There, the carrier exercised with Singapore’s Navy before steaming to the Persian Gulf to support US operations in the Mideast. It is also a focus of US air operations.

Fereidun Fesharaki, an authority on the international oil trade at the East-West Center, a think tank in Honolulu, said:
"If the sea-lanes through the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea were blocked, there would be
disastrous consequences for the region and indirectly for the US. Indeed, such closure would not be tolerable and
they would have to be opened by force."


Moreover, China claims that large parts of the South China Sea are internal waters, which puts Beijing into possible conflict with the Southeast Asian nations whose shores are washed by the sea. They and the US and other Asian nations dispute the Chinese claim. China is believed to be building a naval base on the island of Hainan, in the northern reaches of the South China Sea.

At the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, Lt. Gen. Ma Xiaotian of the People’s Liberation Army was asked what China could contribute to protect the sea-lanes in that sea and the Strait of Malacca. Ma said: "We have noticed in recent years that all regions in Malacca, coastal Bangladesh, coastal Yemen by the Red Sea, and coastal Somali of East Africa have seen rampant pirate activities which threaten seaborne trade of the countries worldwide." He continued: "We advocate for mainly relying on the effort of all coastal countries to combat piracy, the international community to observe charter of the United Nations, to observe the international Law of the Sea. Coastal countries should all play the leading role on maritime security against pirate activities. For example, based on this spirit we recently formed an alliance with coastal countries to carry out sea patrol in common waters."

Major Oil Route

Adm. Timothy J. Keating, chief of US Pacific Command, was in Indonesia recently to encourage cooperation among Southeast Asians on security in the strait and the South China Sea. Keating urged Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and other nations to share intelligence, so that the 50,000 to 70,000 ships (depending on whether coastal ships are included) passing though the sea-lanes each year are safe from pirates and terrorists.

The importance of the strait was underscored by the release last October of the US Navy’s new maritime strategy.

It sets the main concentration for US naval operations in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans. "This combat power can be selectively and rapidly repositioned to meet contingencies that may arise elsewhere," said the paper. Moving ships between the two oceans expeditiously means transiting the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca unhindered.

Over the last two decades, as the economies of Asia have leaped forward, their dependence on Middle Eastern oil has gone up. Oil imports to fuel the economies of China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan flow through the strait from the Persian Gulf in tankers at a rate of 15 million barrels a day. (In contrast, 4.5 million barrels a day move from the Gulf to Europe through the Suez Canal.)

A disruption would have an immediate effect on those economies, soon to be followed by a devastating effect on the US economy. In 2007, total trade between the US and the four leading Asian economies totaled $742 billion—more than half with China.

Southeast Asian intelligence officers said they have been watching closely—even desperately—for evidence that terrorists are plotting to scuttle supertankers in the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok, thus closing the South China Sea to shipping. PACOM officers said governments of the littoral states have trained anti-scuttling forces to react quickly in an effort to prevent that blockage.

Keating, in testimony before Congress in March, agreed on the potential threat from terrorists. "It’s our No. 1 challenge," he said. "I am more concerned with that than I am with, let’s say, North Korea or the People’s Republic of China." He was upbeat, though, adding, "The progress we are making, I think, is significant. ... We are undertaking as broad an effort as I think we can."

Ian Storey, a scholar at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, calls the South China Sea policy "China’s Malacca Dilemma."

On one hand, Beijing claims the waters from the island of Hainan south to the Indonesian island of Natuna as an internal sea, and has suggested that the United States withdraw from the region. A Chinese admiral suggested that the US and China split the Pacific, with China controlling the western half and the US moving to the east. Keating immediately stated explicitly that the US was in Asia to stay. On the other hand, China’s Navy, while modernizing, is still not strong enough to enforce its claim to the South China Sea and to ensure that the strait remains open for the ships plying the China trade and bringing in the bulk of the nation’s oil imports.

"At present, China lacks the naval power necessary to protect its sea-lanes," Storey wrote. "Beijing fears that during a national security crisis ships carrying energy resources could be interdicted by hostile naval forces. Any disruption to the free flow of energy resources into China could derail the economic growth on which the Chinese government depends to shore up its legitimacy and pursue its great power ambitions."

American Pretext?

Thus, China has "a vested interest in the elimination of transnational threats in the waterway," said Storey, "yet Beijing remains uneasy at the prospect of a greater role for external powers in securing the strait."

Some Chinese analysts have accused Washington and Tokyo of "using the threat of terrorism" as "a pretext to expand their naval presence in and around the strait." The Chinese have watched with concern as India has enhanced its presence in the area, especially the modernization of military facilities on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands at the strait’s northwest terminus.

Some in the Chinese commentariat have demonstrated worries that have "bordered on the paranoid," Storey said. One Chinese newspaper, he observed, recently condemned US Indonesia military cooperation as "targeting China" and aiming at "controlling China’s avenue of approach to the Pacific."

US strategy is to rely on Southeast Asian nations to take the lead in protecting the waterways. The supporting role of the US ranges from providing equipment and training, combined exercises, bilateral exchanges, ship visits, multilateral conferences, and planning sessions, to medical and humanitarian assistance.

US concerns about the strait and South China Sea are relatively new. A dozen years ago, several Pacific Command officers came together to discuss this sea-lane. When asked how many ships passed through those waters, one said: "We don’t know. Ask Lloyd’s of London, they keep track of those things."

American interest in the strait, however, was revived four years ago by Adm. Thomas B. Fargo, then PACOM commander. In an address in Singapore to defense ministers and senior military officers from Asia, Fargo proposed a Regional Maritime Security Initiative to protect the sea-lanes from pirates and terrorists.

At first, Fargo’s proposal was misunderstood as suggesting that the US secure the passageways, including posting marines on ships in transit. That caused an uproar among Southeast Asian leaders who saw the security initiative as an encroachment on their sovereignty. They quickly asserted that they would take responsibility for maritime security, which was what Fargo intended.

Adm. William J. Fallon, Fargo’s successor, dropped into the town of Medan not far from the Malacca Strait in Indonesia in February 2006 to discuss the security of the vital waterway. In a meeting with Indonesian naval and police officers, an Indonesian officer told him somewhat diffidently, "Admiral, we really don’t know why you are here. This is our problem and, with our neighbors in Singapore and Malaysia, we can take care of it."

By the tone of his voice and the look on his face, one could see that Fallon was clearly pleased. "It’s your neighborhood," he replied, "and you should do it yourselves. If we can help, please let me know."

The concept appears to have caught on. The Defense Minister of Malaysia, Mohamed Najib Tun Abd Razak, outlined in a speech a year ago the evolution of threats. Before 9/11, he said, security focused on piracy, illegal fishing, and smuggling.

After the terrorist assaults, he said, "the debate has shifted to the potential threat of seaborne terrorism and the risk of terrorist attack on ships transiting along the 885-kilometer [550-mile] waterway. The maritime community also started to link the possibility of a nexus between piracy and terrorism and how piratical activities might become tools of terrorists. Some even raised the possibility of terrorists hijacking tankers and damaging major port facilities."

Singapore’s Defense Minister, Teo Chee Hean, last year spoke at the Changi Naval Base at the commissioning of the frigate Formidable, first in a class of six ships designed to patrol the Malacca Strait and waters around Singapore. Three more were commissioned in February and all are scheduled to be in service in 2009. Changi is also the site of a pier built by Singapore to service US aircraft carriers.

The Straits of Malacca touches the interests of many nations

Air Engagement

The Air Force is heavily engaged. A squadron of Singaporean F-16s assigned to Luke AFB, Ariz., is used by USAF to train pilots for missions over the South China Sea.

The 425th Fighter Squadron also schools weapon systems officers to operate sensors in the backseat of F-16Ds. About 30 percent of the squadron’s sorties are after dark, with pilots learning to use night vision goggles and practicing low-altitude navigation and infrared targeting. Maintenance crews are included in the training.

There is a constant US airpower presence in Southeast Asia. In February, USAF and Navy aircraft deployed to the Singapore Air Show. For an exercise called Commando Sling, F-16s from the 51st Fighter Wing at Osan Air Base in South Korea flew to Singapore last October. (A second Commando Sling scheduled for January was canceled because many F-15s were grounded at the time.)

USAF and marine aviators joined pilots from the Royal Thai Air Force and the Singapore Air Force in Cope Tiger, in Thailand in February. In Balikatan, a Tagalog word meaning "shoulder to shoulder," C-130 and C-17 crews moved equipment, people, and relief supplies through Clark Field in the Philippines in March. Maritime security will be built into Balikatan exercises for at least the next five years.

Less visible were sorties of four B-52 bombers that flew from Guam in four directions to Hawaii, Alaska, Northeast Asia, and Australia to hit targets at the same time.

The US is equipping five to 10 radar sites in each of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines to help track ships. The US feeds intelligence to several nations to nudge them into sharing their own information with neighbors. The first Global Hawk unmanned surveillance plane is scheduled to arrive in Guam, the expanding island base in the central Pacific, in 2009; a key mission will be reconnaissance over the South China Sea.

The oldest combined exercise in Southeast Asia saw the US join Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and Japan in the 27th Cobra Gold exercise in May that included drills to maintain superiority in and over the sea-lanes. Mobility aircraft can be used for both military and humanitarian assistance. "They may not get as much attention as the pointy-nosed airplanes," said one PACAF officer, "but they get the job done moving stuff around."

Intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance capabilities are high on the training agenda.

In other training, the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit did beach landing exercises with Indonesian marines in March. The amphibious ship Essex conducted noncombatant evacuation training at sea in February. Essex would become a safe haven for Americans caught in a natural disaster, war, or civil unrest.

The US underscored its interest by moving the Sealift Logistics Command Far East from Japan to Singapore in 2006. The command operates an average of 50 ships in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, delivering fuel and supplies to US ships, transporting cargo, responding to humanitarian crises, and supporting special operations.

Having the logistics unit in Singapore puts it next to Task Force 73, the command it supports. That task force coordinates Pacific Fleet’s Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises to prepare US warships to operate with the navies of Southeast Asia.

At the eastern end of the South China Sea, US Special Operations Forces are assisting Filipino troops in fighting Abu Sayyaf terrorists in the southern Philippines. Officers at PACOM said the island chains running through the Sulu and Celebes Seas are "ratlines" along which terrorists move among the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.


Free-loading?

The costs of ensuring safe passage have been controversial. In a statement last year, policy experts from groups representing four of the region’s littoral nations noted, "At present, the costs of ensuring the enhancement of safety of navigation and environmental protection are not borne fairly and equitably amongst littoral states, user states, and other beneficiaries of passage through the straits."

The Malaysian Defense Minister, Najib, echoed that consternation, asserting that nations whose ships regularly transit the strait had failed to support the costs of maintaining those sea-lanes. "It is regrettable," he said, "to note that the international users have thus far not matched their usage of the straits with contribution to the costs of maintaining its safety and security."

He singled out Japan as an exception. Japan, which relies on goods flowing through the strait as much as any nation, has helped "enhance navigational safety through the installation and maintenance of navigational aids as well as pollution preventive measures," Najib said, and recently "handed over a training ship ... to the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency."

An occasional US show of force reinforces the concept that the US is committed to free navigation in those waters. The carrier Nimitz sailed through the strait last September to join ships from India, Japan, Australia, and Singapore for an exercise named Malabar near the Andaman Islands close to the Indian Ocean end of the Strait of Malacca.

PACOM officers said that getting nations around the South China Sea to work together requires finding ways to overcome issues of sovereignty. Southeast Asian nations once ruled by France, Britain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and the United States jealously guard the independence gained after World War II and are suspicious of hints at encroachment on newly acquired sovereignty.

The principle of "hot pursuit," for instance, has yet to take hold. For a police vessel to chase a terrorist ship from the territorial waters of one country into the waters of another would violate the sovereignty of the second, and thus would be unacceptable.

American officers encourage multinational cooperation through four steps.

First is to get agencies within a nation to work together, a difficult task even in the US. In Indonesia, for example, 13 agencies are engaged in maritime security.

Second is to get a nation to work across the border with its neighbor. Using subdued language can be essential. "Common operating picture," a phrase Americans use to mean that everyone engaged is seeing the same information at the same time, is shunned as suggesting offensive operations. "Shared situational awareness" is more acceptable.

Third is to persuade those engaged to agree on a process for rapid decisions. In cultures in which decisions are often made by consensus, this takes patient explanation.

Fourth is actual interdiction of a suspected pirate or terrorist by ships and aircraft, and handing information in a timely manner to another nation’s forces. Much has been accomplished through seminars that start out at bilateral senior levels and progress to multilateral gatherings of middle-grade officer

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Richard Halloran, formerly a New York Times foreign correspondent in Asia and military correspondent in Washington, D.C., is a freelance writer based in Honolulu. His most recent article for Air Force Magazine, "Protracted Nuclear War," appeared in the March issue.

 

 

Western Allies Press Indonesia to Open More Sea-Lanes to Warships
By Michael RichardsonPublished: THURSDAY, MAY 16, 1996

JAKARTA: The United States and several allies are pressing Indonesia, whose sea-lanes have long been a key highway for naval vessels sailing between the Asia-Pacific region and the Indian Ocean, to open its waters more widely to free passage of foreign warships, especially submarines.

In sensitive negotiations, Indonesia has proposed three special sea-lanes running in a north-south direction that international shipping could use with minimal restrictions to pass through Indonesian waters.

But the United States, Britain and Australia, supported in principle by Japan, want Indonesia to agree to an east-west sea-lane as well. It would connect directly with the Malacca Strait, the route used by most ships traveling between East Asia and the Gulf.

General John M. Shalikashvili, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said here Wednesday that "as a seafaring nation, we have a deep interest in having the maximum freedom of movement in the seas."

The general said that "the specifics of those matters are best left to the negotiators who are involved in those issues right now."

Today on IHT.com
Inside a 9/11 mastermind's interrogationIndia's growth outstrips cropsIn Iraq's successes, the seeds of vulnerabilityNegotiations between Indonesian and U.S. officials will resume in Jakarta on Friday, while those with Australia will continue in June.

Analysts said that these negotiations and the visit here by General Shalikashvili, the first by the most senior officer in the U.S. armed forces, underlined the strategic importance of Indonesia. Washington has designated Indonesia as one of 10 high-priority countries or growth zones expected to emerge as major economic and political powers — and lucrative markets — in the first quarter of the 21st century.

Indonesia is also the world's largest archipelago, with more than 17,000 islands stretching along the Equator for 5,120 kilometers (3,200 miles).

Deepwater straits between some of these islands allow foreign warships to pass quickly and safely between the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean in the north, and the Indian Ocean in the south.

Submarines can pass the same way undetected by remaining submerged without danger of collision.

Analysts said that for military planners of maritime powers, Indonesia's position between the Pacific and Indian oceans had become even more important after the entry into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1994.

Before then, the Java Sea and many other large bodies of water between Indonesia's islands were treated as open seas; under the treaty, they became internal waters under Indonesia's control as an "archipelagic state." In such waters that are used normally by foreign shipping, the law of innocent passage applies. Under this regime:

Submarines are supposed to travel on the surface and fly their national flag.

Warships are required by some countries to shut down their surveillance radars and weapons sensors, although officials said Indonesia was only asking that there should be no unauthorized broadcasting or radio contact between passing warships and land-based transmitters to prevent spying.

Military aircraft have no rights to fly over internal waters without permission from the coastal state, which can also suspend innocent passage and close areas to foreign planes and ships on security grounds, for example if it wants to hold military exercises.

To meet the concerns of the United States and other maritime powers on the need for unimpeded transit, Indonesia and other archipelagic states recognized by the treaty, including the Philippines, agreed to designate special sea-lanes so that foreign warships and submarines could pass through without innocent-passage restrictions.

Tony Vincent, who heads the Australian negotiators, said that Indonesia was the first archipelagic state to designate proposed sea-lanes and open talks on them with interested parties. "So it is setting a precedent," he said.

Indonesia has proposed three north-south sea-lanes: through the Sunda and Karimata straits to the South China Sea; through the Lombok and Makassar straits to the South China Sea, and from the Indian Ocean and Arafura Sea north of Australia to the Pacific Ocean via the Molucca Sea in Indonesia.

Mr. Vincent said that under the treaty, Australia believed that Indonesia should also designate as special sea-lanes routes that were traditionally used by international shipping, including an east-west sea-lane via the Java Sea to the Malacca Strait.

Indonesian officials, however, said that many of the proposed additional sea-lanes were too shallow or had become too crowded with local vessels and oil and gas rigs for safe passage by foreign naval vessels, especially submerged submarines.

Ali Alatas, Indonesia's foreign minister, said that by offering the three widely used north-south routes as special sea-lanes, Indonesia was trying to interpret its commitment under the treaty "in a way that we think is reasonable."
But he said that the United States and Australia were "not very happy" with the proposal.

"They want a fourth archipelagic sea-lane going east-west through the Java Sea," he said. "But we have told them that the Java Sea is full of undersea cables and oil rigs. It's a very shallow sea, in many parts only 45 meters. So we are rather reluctant to make it an archipelagic sea-lane."

If no agreement can be reached, Indonesia could seek to have its special sea-lanes formally designated by the International Maritime Organization, a United Nations agency.

But Mr. Alatas said that Jakarta would like to have "a good agreement with all users so that there is no question of conflict or tensions." He said that Indonesia's aim now was to "convince our partners that the offer of these three sea-lane passages is a good offer and that for the rest they can use other routes on the basis of innocent passage."

As an Archipelagic State, Indonesia has the right to designate Sea Lanes for "continuous and expeditious" passage of foreign shipping
through its waters and the adjacent Territorial Sea. At the same time the State has an obligation to accurately chart such Sea Lanes
and to facilitate safe navigation by publishing appropriate and correct navigational charts.

The Baruna Jaya I and Baruna Jaya II are the vessels designated to survey the Sea Lanes.
When needed, Baruna Jaya III will also participate in this activity.

 

 Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 16
Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes
Lieutenant Commander Penny Campbell, RAN

Indonesia is, both geographically and legally, an archipelagic nation. The concept that the nation is a single entity comprised of the entirety of the archipelagoes, their individual islands and surrounding waters, is a core Indonesian belief, known as Wawasan Nusantara (archipelagic outlook). (footnote 1) With this fundamental belief rooted in its national psyche, Indonesia was one of several states that successfully advocated special recognition for archipelagic states during a series of international negotiations, which culminated in the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC). Indonesia was the first archipelagic nation to take advantage of the archipelagic regime provided by LOSC. Accordingly, Indonesia's initial proposal to designate archipelagic sea lanes (ASL) compelled the international community to consider how the theoretically derived legal provisions of the Convention were to be implemented.

LOSC represents a compromise between the growing jurisdiction of coastal states over their adjoining waters and the desire of other states to retain their historical freedom of the seas. This compromise is neatly illustrated in Part IV of LOSC, which deals with archipelagic states. It recognises the archipelagic state's sovereignty over its archipelagic waters, but requires that this sovereignty be subject to the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage. For an archipelagic state to benefit from the regime in Part IV, it must meet two criteria. Firstly, it must satisfy the definition of an archipelagic state, and secondly it must draw its baselines in accordance with the LOSC provisions.

Article 46 of LOSC defines an archipelagic state as one that is 'constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos' and which may include other islands. An archipelago means a group of islands and other natural features which 'are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such.' In many respects, this definition embodies the Wawasan Nusantara concept.

An archipelagic state may draw straight baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs. The baselines must enclose the main islands of the archipelago, and the enclosed water to land ratio must be between 1:1 and 9:1. This requirement prevents island countries such as New Zealand or the United Kingdom, which are made up of a few dominant islands, from claiming archipelagic status. It also ensures that states with widely dispersed archipelagoes such as Kiribati and Tuvalu cannot draw baselines around small distant islands. (footnote 2) The waters within the straight baselines are called archipelagic waters. Each straight baseline must be less than 100 nm in length but up to 3 percent of the total number of baselines can be up to a maximum length of 125 nm. This rather complex formula was designed with Indonesia's circumstances in mind, as Indonesia's longest straight baseline is 124 nm.

An archipelagic state enjoys sovereignty over its archipelagic waters, and two passage regimes apply in all archipelagic waters: those of innocent passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage.

All vessels, including warships, enjoy the right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters, but the archipelagic state may temporarily suspend innocent passage, on a non-discriminatory basis, through specified areas when the suspension is essential for the protection of the state's security. Innocent passage requires a vessel to conduct continuous and expeditious transit in a manner that is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the archipelagic state.

An archipelagic state may designate ASL, and corresponding air routes, which are suitable for continuous and expeditious passage through the archipelago. Article 53(9) of LOSC requires a cooperative approach between the archipelagic state and the international community before ASLs can be formally promulgated. If it wishes to designate ASLs, the archipelagic state must refer the proposal to the 'competent international organisation' with a view to their adoption. That organisation may only adopt such ASLs as may be agreed with the archipelagic state, after which the archipelagic state may designate them.

The phrase 'competent international organisation' is not explained in the text of LOSC but in 1994 the UN Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea published a list of UN bodies expert in particular subject areas. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) was acknowledged as the relevant competent organisation for the purposes of LOSC Article 53. The IMO was created by international convention to assist states in adopting 'the highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships'. (footnote 3) The IMO provides guidance on ships routing systems, which includes guidance on the adoption, designation and substitution of ASL.

An archipelagic state does not have to designate ASL, but if it does, LOSC Article 53(4) requires that the designation include all normal passage routes used for international navigation. It is this requirement to designate all routes that came under special scrutiny in light of Indonesia's proposal.

The passage regime that applies in ASLs -archipelagic sea lanes passage (ASLP)-permits transiting vessels to operate in their normal mode. Normal mode is a more lenient regime than innocent passage. For example, a submarine can transit submerged through an ASL but must transit on the surface while undertaking innocent passage, and a ship may launch and recover aircraft in an ASL but may not do so on innocent passage. Importantly, while an archipelagic state may suspend innocent passage on a temporary basis for security reasons, it cannot suspend ASLP under any circumstances.

Until an archipelagic state has completely designated its ASLs, vessels can exercise ASLP through all routes normally used for international navigation. Once a complete ASL designation has been made, vessels are restricted to exercising the right of ASLP through those lanes, and can only conduct innocent passage through the remaining archipelagic waters.

Indonesia is the first and, to date, only archipelagic state to seek to designate its ASLs. Indonesia formally submitted its ASL proposal to the 67th session of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the IMO in May 1996. It worked closely with the United States and Australia, representing all user states, in formulating this proposal for three north-south ASLs through the archipelago. (footnote 4) Because key routes such as an east-west passage were not included, Indonesia's approach was not entirely consistent with the requirement of Article 53(4) to propose 'all normal routes used for international navigation.' Nonetheless, the IMO accepted that the proposal would be a partial designation only and that, until such time as Indonesia had designated all normal routes as ASL, the right to ASLP would continue to apply in the remaining non-designated routes. In 1998, the IMO formally adopted this partial system of ASL in Indonesian waters, (footnote 5) thus demonstrating its willingness to accommodate individual cases within the apparent confines of the LOSC.


Map of Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes (green lines) with proposed additional Sea Lanes(thin blue lines) (RAN)

Indonesia proclaimed the three north-south ASLs in Government Regulation No. 37 of 2002. Article 15 of this Regulation states that foreign ships and aircraft may only exercise the right of ASLP through the routes designated in that Regulation. Article 3 paragraph 2 states 'the right of archipelagic sea lane passage in other parts of Indonesian waters can be conducted after such a sea lane has been designated in those waters for the purpose of this transit.' (footnote 6) This implied that ships transiting through other routes would be limited to innocent passage. This view appeared to be supported by the 'elucidation' of Regulation 37 annexed to the IMO's Safety of Navigation Circular, which stated 'foreign ships planning to navigate [through the archipelago] may do so with the exercise of the right of innocent passage in the Indonesian waters equally within the archipelagic sea lanes or beyond the archipelagic sea lanes.' (footnote 7)

The implications for maritime states' merchant and military fleets caused some concern and several nations raised the issue through diplomatic channels. During the MSC meeting in June 2003, the Indonesian delegate read from a prepared statement confirming that the nature of the Indonesian designation was a partial one and that Indonesia had confirmed this on repeated occasions in various IMO fora. (footnote 8) The delegate noted Indonesia's responsibility for the safety of shipping transiting its waters and stated that much more technical and hydrographic work needed to be done before the designation of all normal routes of passage as ASLs could be completed. However, the delegate did refer to the 'basic problem' of identifying what constitutes a normal route.

In the international arena, Indonesia maintains that its ASL designation is only partial and accepts the right of ASLP is available to transiting vessels that navigate through normal routes used for international navigation. However, documents such as Regulation 37 and notices to mariners (footnote 9) take a clearly contrary view: Indonesian law states that the only right of passage outside the three designated ASLs is that of innocent passage. This disparity between Indonesia's international and domestic position poses a difficulty for transiting vessels.

The MSC has stated that the 'IMO shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the process of adopting archipelagic sea lanes until such time that sea lanes including all normal passage routes have been adopted.' (footnote 10) Where a partial designation has been adopted, the archipelagic state is obliged to periodically advise on its plans for conducting further surveys and 'is ultimately required to propose for adoption archipelagic sea lanes including all normal passage routes and navigational channels'. No time frame is given for this to occur.

It is in Indonesia's interests to designate all normal routes as ASLs. Once it has fully designated its ASLs, transiting vessels will be restricted to exercising ASLP only in those ASLs, and will be limited to innocent passage through the rest of the archipelago. Until this is completed, Indonesia will have difficulty in enforcing its domestic law against transiting vessels.

Further work on the designation of its ASLs would reassure the user states that Indonesia is moving to resolve the differences between its international obligations and its domestic law.

Published as Issue 6, April 2005

Notes
A. D. Supriadi, 'Does the Sea Divide or Unite Indonesians? Ethnicity and Regionalism from a Maritime Perspective', Resource Management in Asia-Pacific, Working Paper No. 48, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 2003, p. 4.
R. R. Churchill, and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea - 3rd edition, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1999, p. 123.
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation, 1948, Article 1(a). The Organisation became the International Maritime Organisation in 1982.
The first north-south ASL runs from the South China Sea or Singapore Strait through the Natuna Sea, Karimata Strait, the western Java Sea and Sunda Strait; the second, from the Sulawesi and Celebes Seas through the Makassar Strait, Flores Sea and Lombok Strait; the third through the Molucca, Ceram and Banda Seas with spurs to the Savu, Timor and Arafura Seas.
Resolution MSC 72(69), Adoption, Designation and Substitution of Archipelagic Sea Lanes, adopted 19 May 1998.
Indonesian Government Regulation No. 37 of 2002, as annexed to IMO Memo SN/Circ.200/Add.1, 3 July 2003 (emphasis added).
'Elucidation of Regulation Number 37', Official State Gazette of The Republic of Indonesia, No. 4210, as annexed to IMO SN/Circ.200/Add.1, 3 July 2003.
Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Seventy-seventh Session, MSC 77/26 dated 10 June 2003, para. 28.40, p. 128, and Annex 27.
\For example, paragraph 2 of Indonesian Notice to Mariners No 08/2003 states 'Foreign ships and airplanes which pass through Indonesian waters must utilize the Archipelagic Sea Lanes as established.'
Resolution MSC 71(69), Adoption of Amendments to the General Provisions on Ships' Routeing, adopted 19 May 1998.

 

National Territory: Rights and Responsibilities


The legal responsibility for Indonesia's environment continued to be a matter of controversy in the early 1990s. Among the continuing concerns were those expressed in 1982 during the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. In this conference, Indonesia sought to defend its March 1980 claim to a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. Based on the doctrine of the political and security unity of archipelagic land and sea space (wawasan nusantara), the government asserted its rights to marine and geological resources within this coastal zone. In all, the area claimed the government, including the exclusive economic zone, was 7.9 million square kilometers. Indonesia also claimed as its territory all sea areas within a maritime belt of twelve nautical miles of the outer perimeter of its islands. All straits, bays, and waters within this belt were considered inland seas by the government and amounted to around 93,000 square kilometers. The Strait of Malacca--one of the most heavily traveled sea-lanes in the world--was considered by Indonesia and Malaysia to be their joint possession, and the two countries requested that other nations notify their governments before moving warships through these waters. The United States and several other nations rejected those claims, considering the strait an international waterway.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, Indonesia was involved in territorial disputes. One controversy concerned Indonesia's annexation of the former colony of Portuguese Timor as Timor Timur Province in 1976, an action which came under protest in the UN and among human rights activists (see Human Rights and Foreign Policy , ch. 4).

Another dispute involved Indonesia's conflict with Australia over rights to the continental shelf off the coast of Timor. This problem was resolved in 1991 by a bilateral agreement calling for joint economic exploitation of the disputed area in the so-called "Timor Gap." Still other controversies arose regarding overflight rights in Irian Jaya (disputed with Papua New Guinea) and conflicting claims to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Indonesia played the role of mediator in the Spratly Islands controversy (see Foreign Policy , ch. 4).

Even as Indonesia extended its claim to territory, international environmental groups were pressing Jakarta to accept environmental responsibility for those territories. Indonesia was encouraged to monitor pollution in its territorial waters and take legal action to prevent the destruction of its rain forests. Since the late 1960s, the government addressed increasing environmental problems by establishing resource management programs, conducting environmental impact analyses, developing better policy enforcement, and enacting appropriate laws to give government officials proper authority. Despite these efforts, overlapping competencies among government departments and legal uncertainties about which department had what authority slowed progress made against environmental degradation.
 



Putting the Cart Before the Horse:
United States resumes military assistance to Indonesia

Introduction
In March 2006 the State Department formally ended a seven-year ban on U.S. exports of lethal defense articles to Indonesia.
Indonesia had been under various combinations of U.S. military sanctions over the past 14 years, due to persistent and grave human rights violations by members of its security forces. This significant policy change removes all restrictions on military assistance for the first time since 1992. However, in the absence of any documented human rights improvements by the Indonesian armed forces, the timing of the decision is perplexing.

Understanding the Ban
Although Indonesia had perpetrated countless human rights abuses in East Timor since invading and occupying the country in 1975, the existing ban on military assistance was a specific response to Indonesia’s actions in East Timor in the 1990s.

(Editor's note:
See the role the US played in the East Timor issue - .
The document shows that Suharto began the invasion knowing
that he had the full approval of the White House)
East Timor revisited
The Indonesia/East Timor Documentation Project


In 1991, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI), wielding U.S.-supplied weapons, massacred 271 civilians participating in a pro-democracy demonstration in East Timor. In response, 52 U.S. senators sent a letter to President George H.W. Bush asking that the United States take a stronger stance against the gross violations of human rights coordinated by Indonesia’s security forces. Congress first placed legislative restrictions on military assistance to Indonesia in the fiscal year (FY) 1993 foreign operations appropriations bill, banning all International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds for Indonesia. Congress reenacted this ban in both FY 94 and FY 95. At the same time, the State Department banned the sale or export of small arms and light weapons and crowd control equipment to Indonesia, and expanded the policy in FY 96 to prohibit exports of helicopter-mounted equipment and armored vehicles as well. In FY 96, the IMET ban was relaxed slightly to allow civilian personnel (but not military officers) to attend Expanded IMET (E-IMET) courses.

During the period leading up to and following a referendum on independence in 1999, the TNI orchestrated a scorched-earth campaign in East Timor, killing over 1400 East Timorese citizens, displacing two-thirds of the population, and destroying three-quarters of the country’s infrastructure. In response, President Bill Clinton severed all remaining military ties to Indonesia, including banning the export of all defense articles and services, lethal or non-lethal. Congress translated this ban into legislation in FY 00, conditioning the resumption of IMET and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) on documented reform of the TNI and prosecution of abusive members. Although E-IMET was reinstated in FY 02, the murders of three school teachers (two of them U.S. citizens) in the Indonesian province of West Papua in August 2002 caused Congress to extend the IMET ban until the Indonesian government and armed forces had sufficiently cooperated with U.S. investigations into the killings.

Dismantling the Ban
In February 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that Indonesia would, for the first time since 1992, be eligible for full IMET funding. In May 2005 Rice also decided to permit non-lethal foreign military sales to Indonesia. These decisions were made even though the State Department’s annual human rights reports continued to document serious abuses by the TNI. During the FY 06 appropriations process, Congress rejected a Bush administration request to strike all remaining restrictions from the text of the foreign operations appropriations bill but, as a compromise, included a clause authorizing the secretary of state to waive the restrictions for reasons of national security. Rice took advantage of this loophole only 48 hours after the appropriations bill was signed into law in November 2005. On March 29, 2006, the administration announced that the export of lethal defense articles to Indonesia could resume as well, effectively returning the U.S.-Indonesian military relationship to its pre-1992 conditions.

Rice’s decisions to unilaterally erase restrictions that Congress supported in seven consecutive foreign operations appropriations bills have not been well-received. Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., and Sen. Russ Feingold, D-Wis., sent a letter to Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld expressing their disappointment in the administration’s actions. Human rights communities in East Timor, Indonesia, and the United States argue that the administration has squandered leverage, granted by the legislated restrictions, to encourage positive change within the Indonesian armed forces and justice for East Timor. The administration’s decision to bypass these conditions, by exercising the national security waiver instead of waiting for Indonesia to meet the conditions for resumption, has the symbolic value of exonerating human rights abusers within the TNI.

With the congressional restrictions on military assistance for the TNI suddenly and surprisingly out of the way, the Bush administration’s current budget request appears to be rapidly making up for lost time. The most recent budget justification for foreign operations reveals a $1.3 million request for IMET and a $6.5 million request for FMF funds – a nearly seven-fold increase over the previous year’s expenditure. The administration has provided several justifications for bypassing the legislated restrictions and reinstating this assistance to Indonesia. Indonesia’s strategic role in the war on terror has been chief among these justifications, which fits a larger trend to increase U.S. assistance to countries willing to participate in counter-terrorist activities alongside the United States, regardless of their human rights records. The administration has also cited a need for “increased professional links” with Indonesian security forces, after the 2004 tsunami, during which the United States and Indonesia collaborated on an international response to the humanitarian disaster.

* FY 05 DCS and FMS figures are estimates; ** FY 06 DCS, FMS, IMET, and FMF figures are estimates; *** FY 07 DCS and FMS figures are estimates; IMET and FMF figures represent the budget request

In spite of the ban on IMET and FMF, Indonesia has hardly been cut off from U.S. security assistance and, over the past several years, has been eligible for other forms of security assistance and training. Since FY 02, Congress has appropriated more than $30 million for Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) to Indonesia under the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account – funding that is not covered by other legislated restrictions. In the FY 02 Emergency Supplemental alone, passed in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, nearly $8 million of NADR-ATA funding was earmarked for Indonesia. Through the NADR-ATA and other programs, the U.S. government has poured tens of millions of dollars into the Indonesian police, including the creation of a special anti-terrorism unit known as Detachment 88, which, according to some human rights organizations, is accumulating its own troubling human rights record.

During the first five years that the congressional ban on IMET was in place for Indonesia, U.S. Special Operations Forces trained with the Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus) under the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program. When this news became public in 1998, outrage in the Congress led to the immediate suspension of the program. However, as of FY 05, JCET has again been made available to Indonesia. The United States has also engaged the Indonesian armed forces in other joint and combined exercises alongside the U.S. military. In 2005, Indonesia was scheduled to participate in more than 132 events under the U.S. Pacific Command Theater Security Cooperation Program. Members of TNI participated in the 2005 and 2006 Cobra Gold joint-combined exercise, and the commander of the notorious Kopassus participated in the Pentagon’s 2006 Pacific Area Special Operations Conference.

Additionally, since 2001, Indonesia has been the top recipient of funds from a new Pentagon program known as the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP). Many observers have pointed out the similarities between CTFP and the IMET program, as well as highlighted the one main difference – CTFP recipients are subject to much less human rights scrutiny than IMET recipients. Indonesia is slated to receive $700,000 in CTFP funding for FY 06. A new $200 million Pentagon fund for increasing the counter-terrorism capabilities of foreign militaries may also substantially benefit Indonesia, as the waterways surrounding Indonesia, such as the Straits of Malacca, are a primary target for this funding. On May 5, 2006, the administration announced that up to $19 million will be available for Indonesia under this new funding authority.

Conclusion: The Wrong Way Forward?
Since the fall of the dictator Suharto in 1998, Indonesia has been transitioning towards a fully democratic government. The election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in September 2004 marked the country’s first direct presidential election. However, bringing the security forces fully under civilian control has not yet been accomplished. The U.S. State Department’s most recent human rights report (2005) stated that, “security forces continued to commit unlawful killings of rebels, suspected rebels, and civilians in areas of separatist activity, where most politically motivated extrajudicial killings also occurred.” Additionally, the TNI garners an estimated 70 percent of its budget from unaccountable sources, such as illegal logging, and military commanders still outrank civilian officials in the Ministry of Defense. Moreover, not a single Indonesian officer has been held accountable for the crimes against humanity committed in East Timor in 1999, not to mention the previous quarter-century of Indonesian military occupation that killed well over 100,000 East Timorese.

The TNI remains largely unreformed, and the Bush administration’s decision to substantially increase military ties with the Indonesian armed forces in spite of this fact perpetuates the cycle of impunity in Indonesia. Ultimately, by pressuring for the inclusion of and immediately invoking the national security waiver, the administration has dismantled an important source of leverage the United States possessed for improving human rights conditions in Indonesia and East Timor. The administration avows that it is, “important to the United States that the world’s largest Muslim population is a stable democracy,” but providing lethal defense articles and military training to security forces that are not fully accountable to a civilian administration is an ineffective means to that end.

(Editor's Note:
Read " Suharto: A Declassified Documentary Obit" -
This document shows the U.S. supported a "corrupt elite" in the Suharo years,
as long as this benefited the U.S. interests.)


----------------------------------------------------
The author wishes to thank Karen Orenstein, of the East Timor and Indonesia Action Network, for her contributions to this article.

 

 

 

 

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